Tuesday, March 24, 2020

Why Good People Don’t Get Laid.


Why Good People Don’t Get Laid. (if They are Smart.)

One of the more disturbing discussions that I had with Joseph was, of course, upon the topic of Involuntary Celibacy. This is a mounting health concern which affects me personally as well as it affects me intellectually, and I have spent considerable time exploring it, both consciously and unconsciously, if only to atone for time which might otherwise have been spent practicing sex.
The contention made, by someone using an online forum, was that there is no such thing as a suicide by an involuntary celibate, since those who kill themselves for lack of consensual sex are murdered by society.
The counterargument, which infuriated me as much as I hope it will infuriate my readers, was expressed in the following ejaculation: How great it must be to be so ENTITLED that the World should literally OWE you happiness!!
Of course, my instinct was to scream at the respondent. Despite the terrifying conditions which involuntary celibates report, by no means short of social anomie, the condition remains a rare affliction, aggravated in its psychosocial impact by its very rarity. It would appear to be nothing short of savagery to accuse the ordinary person of willfully perpetuating it; ordinarily, I content myself in the thought that, were it better known, then it would abate, for the cure is so readily available that one might laugh until one cries. The sheer thought that a human life would be wasted for lack of intimacy would have appeared tragic to me at any age, in any age, even the most stringently religious and repressive one. One can only hope, for those in whom the erotic instinct is sublimated as self-murder, that they are truly not missed, as many of the conscientious ones expect. As it stands, however, a frequent jibe on the part of neoconservatives, directed at involuntary celibates, is that they initially imagine themselves to be attractive by the authority of their parents, who, after all, are seldom celibate and far more seldom virginal. The very fact that this relationship arises, presuming that the neocons retain at least SOME relevance, would seem to indicate that the death of the involuntary celibate, resultant from the nature of this depraving condition, is more tragic than simply the Death of One Man, which appears tragic by itself only insofar as men (in the generic sense, referring to people of either gender) value themselves as ends in themselves. Furthermore, if any of the pressure to procreate or die originates within the family of the sufferer, it does imply as well two salient points: one is that there is, in fact, a social objectivity to claims made by the parents on behalf of the sufferer’s redeeming and even distinguishing qualities, for those moments wherein the parents are relatively miserly with praise substantiate the conditional nature of the praise itself, though that might hardly satiate the deeper longing for unconditionality. The other point is that the parents themselves take part in what the primary writer referred to as “social murder”, implying that not only the society but the very privilege of procreation retains a hypocrisy which can prove clinically fatal. Yet, as I maintain, it would be far too barbaric to accuse any ordinary person of perpetuating the process consciously.
If I had, therefore, not to scream but to calmly instruct, hoping to suppress, with some futility, my passive aggression, I would respond thus: “I do not NEED to imagine being entitled to happiness. The World DOES owe me that, and you do It a disservice by suggesting a Life outside of this conviction.”
In doing so, I defend everyone.

Instead of putting my efforts towards the future, I should like to suspend Utopian goals in favour of social obligations as they are understood in the Present, informed by History.
The ethic of the contemporary age is an ethic of weakness, rightfully so, for its hidden strength is not only in power but in the capacity to use power in the service of the powerless. Neoconservatism, conversely, might be the perfect character foil for modern ethics, for it is an orchestrated (but nonetheless unrehearsed and poorly composed) attempt to sabotage modern morality and to restore society to the Old Ways.
The old ethic is, in summary, an ethic of strength, but more specifically it is an ethic BY the STRONG, FOR the Strong. Man emerged from the Jungle by the primal force of will, as dictated by a chaotic Nature. He formed societies as a playful expression of this same will (to) power, an enterprise made serious only to the extent of the leader’s anger, which had to be made the object of a fear; hence “seriousness” emerged out of the synthesis of the tyrant’s unrest and the subject’s terror. When a “person of authority” (literally: the “mask of creation”, in which case an “author” is tantamount to a policeman or the leader of a gang) impresses upon a subordinate the “seriousness of a matter”, (as it ought to be remembered, in the terms of Watts, the seriousness of an “illusion”, which in itself implies “playfulness”) he means for the recipient of this information to sympathize with the officer’s wishes; it follows logically, therefore, that the emotional content of the wish in question must at once include the fear (or desire) of the recipient and the desperation of the authority. What we describe, therefore, as “seriousness” is essentially a synthetic compound of phobia and neurosis, though the nature of the synthesis is such that it disguises the components; were the leader to TRULY appear “desperate”, or were it confessed that the subordinate were genuinely fearful, the matter would appear comical.
Anxious to control their populations, the tyrants of old joined forces and established various paradigms of seriousness, which were internalized by their subjects as ethical obligations. One of the functions of these systems was to eliminate weakness in the population, specifically by eliminating weak people. Jordan Peterson’s theory that the most “conscientious” and “hard-working” members of a society eliminated all the “slackers” long ago confesses to my own theory herein. While Peterson embarrasses himself as a Nietzschean by equating strength in “sharing labour” with moral clarity, (as opposed to sharing resources, just as he prefers “equal opportunity” piously and deontologically to “equal outcome”) he does illustrate the nature of tyranny in a society ruled by serious meritocrats. What Peterson omits, presuming upon the prejudices of his audience, (who must have a lot of willpower and nerve to even attend him,) is that it was not that being immoral made you weak; being weak made you immoral, and the nature of this was again obscured, referred to as the vice of “sloth” (laziness). The Old Morality was designed entirely to oppress and to suppress human weakness, and even at its most pious and religious it envisioned a God who was far more terrifying than any tyrant, to whom laziness was sin. In the West, Sensitivity only truly became a virtue in men (here, I refer specifically to males) in the nineteenth century, and it was promptly swallowed up by Nationalism. It took a century of atrocity and upheaval thereafter to teach Humanity a lesson about the consequences of rule by the use of unregulated force. If you encounter anyone nowadays who professes a nostalgia for the Old Morality, that person has probably at some point sympathized with Nazism, unconsciously or outspokenly.

Is it not most authoritarian, though, to imply that women ought to be FORCED to sleep with men to whom they are not otherwise attracted? Let it be made unequivocally clear that this was NEVER the proffered solution. What was called into question was not the means by which an involuntary celibate attempts to “ascend” to sexual activity, but rather his* right to do so.

*Here, I use the generic “he” again to refer to sufferers of both genders, though I confine gender to two.

Traditionally, virtue was defined, under numerous paradigms, as “that which is owed to a man”. In this case, “man” again functions as a root word to represent all human beings; if “Superman” must be made “Superperson” because the instance of the suffix “man” implies “man” to be the category, then a “woman”, by the same token, is a “man”, generically. More importantly, the passive term “is owed to” implies a debtor, yet who “owes” anything “to” the man of virtue? In this instance, “Society” is both the authority and the debtor; in the absence of a target of the man’s own arbitration, the debt is sublimated by the general public. The Old Society supervised the payment of debts by holding the weak accountable to the strong; the New Society not only supervises the payment of debts to the weak, but it in itself promises them, for it is the Society Itself which must ultimately pay. Social Welfare Programs epitomize this.
When the involuntary celibate contends that his brethren are “killed by Society”, he alludes to this New Morality. He contends that, whether by birth, good works, or faith alone, there are those among us who suffer a form of social exclusion which is intolerable to them, and they deserve better. His interlocutor then mocks him by prompting us to “imagine” a World wherein some principle of Justice recognized this entitlement. Yet an entitlement remains an external, objective factor. Even if only the entitled party recognizes its value, the very nature of moral language implies that some people are truly worthy. Ordinarily, one would look to people of authority to determine personal worth. Yet as the result of what Kierkegaard calls “leveling”, democratic societies increasingly and exceedingly, perhaps even excessively, have moved away from traditional models of authority in favour of egalitarian, individualistic ones. When I say “individualistic” herein, I do NOT refer to a social order which EMPOWERS the Individual as an end in and of himself, but rather I refer to a sort of mob rule which is motivated by the coagulation of self-interest. Furthermore, the work of Kohlberg indicates that MOST individuals never mature past conventional moral reasoning. The function of an egalitarian mob is to suppress Individuality and to fetishize various aesthetic trends in its wake; the function of the Judge, therefore, is not to impose the Law upon the People, but rather to adapt it TO them, effectively yielding to the mob at the expense of the Individual, both as an imminence and as a possibility. This condition accounts for the Absurd nature of the Kangaroo Court as it has been caricatured by Franz Kafka, etc. It also accounts for the deep-seated distrust that modern people have towards the Law, reflected in contempt for law enforcement. Left to his own devices, betrayed by the very System of which he is a Juror, and surrounded by self-seeking egomaniacs, the modern man finds no recourse but to judge his own worth. Hence the valuation of “entitlement” is internalized, and one always runs the risk of falling into “self-entitlement”, the overvaluation of one’s own social value.
Yet the most dangerous evil remains a collective one, and it rests in the abbreviation of “self-entitlement” as “entitlement”. This absurd reduction implies that ALL feelings of personal value, expressed as social debt, can amount to nothing more than personal pretensions and projections. In summary: you can deal with involuntary celibacy by retaining the internal conviction that you deserve better. What kills people is the felt sense of worthlessness, the tendency for self-pity, a response to social injustice, to become redirected as self-loathing, consenting to the suggestion that the injustice was the fault of the victim. That people should force themselves to love anyone or anything is not reasonable; that they should never blame the other for loving THEM is an absolute imperative. One can content one’s self with celibacy by knowing one’s self to be entitled; what is impermissible is to challenge this feeling of entitlement, for by so doing one upsets every attempt at moral order.

[({Dm.A.A.)}]

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