Saturday, August 29, 2015

Reasons (and Intuitions) to prefer the Intuition to the Reason (whilst employing both.)

Reasons (and Intuitions) to prefer the Intuition to the Reason (whilst employing both.)

1.       REASON DEPENDS UPON FORCE. Logic can go on indefinitely in an infinite regression; even the ancient Greeks knew this. The moment that an elaboration becomes a “warrant” is decided by the person in power in a given situation. In 1984, truth is determined even on a mathematical level by the Totalitarian State. Winston Smith breaks with this by finding his OWN reasoning, but as will be established this is fruitless because it only function to CONVINCE OTHERS (3) and it is really secondary to Intuition; intuition comes first, and so it is really the necessary of the two. (6).
2.       INTUITION INCLUDES MORE INFORMATION. Jung posited and pretty much proved (though all science is falsifiable) that the Intuition is one’s key to a Vast Store of Unconscious Knowledge, whereas Reason prejudices egoic consciousness and habit. Even the parenthetical statement within this very paragraph was not dredged up by the force of Reason and Will (1), but it swam to the top Intuitively as the most convincing possible argument available to the writer. Wisdom depends not only upon knowledge and “clarity of thought” (as though the mind were not all ways, in its Nature, as per Wittgenstein, Logical [though if logic alone is not sufficient, as we are demonstrating, this would explain “illogical” behaviour according to a cause other than an “absence of logic”.]), but upon the intuitive* capacity to know how to APPLY that information (so that it BECOMES Knowledge rather than “sheer fact”), and perhaps most importantly knowing when to use what argument, as well as when to be silent, as not only Wittgenstein but countless yogis have attested.
For these reasons Jung scholar and mythologist Joseph Campbell called the Unconscious the Wisdom Body.
3.       REASON IS ONLY USED TO CONVEY TRUTH TO *other* PEOPLE.
4.       INTUITION IS MORE FEMININE. Intuitively, one can explain the reason that men tend to be cited more than women do as intellectual authorities. It is not the result of a prejudice. In fact, citing mainly women or even as many women as one cites men could be symptomatic of a feminist or equalist prejudice on the part of consciousness. There is no absolute reason to believe men and women to be indeterminate from one an other. Men seem very observably, for those who possess the feminine quality of Intuition, to be more showy and active, whereas women even who disavow gender tend to be more quiet and passive. But it is only symptomatic of a systematic contempt for the feminine virtues and a LACK of this feminine attentiveness that leads feminists and equalists to presume the exception to be the rule, so hating the feminine that they disown it and pretend towards a masculine-centred view of “equality” that De Beauvoir criticised and that was SO influenced by nineteenth-century Rationalism (explaining thus their systematic contempt for the nineteenth century; if we were ALLOWED by feminists to study it through its own lens it would destroy the feminist narrative) that it would have made Plath cringe.
Intuition tells you this; Reason only seeks to differ attention to arguments about “social forces” that, as stated above, are demonstrations of Force (1), for people in power are at liberty to disconfirm intuitions as all-too-personal, have a narrower context (2) for what “makes sense” and is allowed to be an argument, (a patriarchal position, as M. Woodman** defines it.), and can walk off if they are not convinced but flatter their selves as superior to the uninformed if they have succeeded in appealing to the prejudices of, or duping, others (3). And all of these are extraverted-biased. Social forces are only a determining factor for social people ([as] Jung [posited]), and those INCLUDE (as above)
1.       Force (in a Group or Power Structure),
2.       Ego (in a low-context culture), and
3.       Other people in the sense of public opinion (rather than solidarity, as will be explained in 8.).
5.       INTUITION IS MORE FREE-FLOWING. [William] James calls this the “stream of consciousness” that creative writers tap into. Jung calls it “non-directed thought”, a form more primordial than Directed Thought, or verbal language. Derrida actually corroborates Jung by claiming we prefer in a masculine-centred way the spoken word to the written word, which life-long readers know to be, in the latter case, much more enticing phenomenologically*** to the Imagination.
6.       INTUITION IS MORE IMMEDIATE. We know things Intuitively long before we can convey them to other people.
7.       INTUITION IS MORE SELF-EMPOWERING. Because now I know things instantly (5,6) and I do not need to force people to agree with me for them to be true (1, 3). Plus I know more (2) and am more well-integrated and less of a dick (4).
8.       INTUITION CREATES GENUINE SOLIDARITY IN A GROUP. Whilst a Herd of people can be miss-led by Reason, a Society of people, or a social group that respects the individuals that are parts of it, can facilitate discussion wherein conclusions arrived at by a number of people independently can be seen to have been held in common all along. Kohlberg would distinguish this in his Ethical Theory as the distinction betwixt Conventional, Level Three reasoning (Conformism to “social norm” and “social cue”) in the former case and Post-Conventional, Level Six reasoning (Moral Universals that follow Relativism and Individualism) in the latter case.
9.       INTUITION IS MORE EMPATHIC. The foot-note evidences the writer’s empathic capacity (and confidence) to imagine Rationalist arguments without necessarily feeling as though one were committing the same fallacies as the Rationalists do.
10.   INTUITION WORKS. For all the reasons above. Reason divides people from one an other in endless political discussion and arm chair philosophy occurring on the spectrum of privileged to neurotic. Intuition guides us WHETHER WE KNOW IT OR NOT. Intuition is the stream; Reason is but a craft used to carry people from one side to the other, and per chance from one end to the other. But one can swim without a craft, even if the River is Wide and Deep. The craft helps us just not top drown (in psychosis, for instance, when Intuition is given such free reign as in Romanticism that there is no discernment left on the part of consciousness to discern bad vibes from good vibes, and not ENOUGH ego to want to SHARE one’s Intuitions WITH the group, knowing them to be true regardless of whether or not the Grail is accepted, as in the Arthurian Legends and of course every myth known to man, but ESPECIALLY that of the Buddhist Bodhisattva. Oh and the Christ as well apparently.)
*This reasoning is not circular (1. Intuition matters because 2. Wisdom depends upon it because 3. Intuition matters) but rather indicative (Look: I know that intuition exists. I do not need to PROVE it to you. (3) But I am using Reason to OFFER you a chance to LOOK at it and observe it in theory. This is using empiricism against rationalism in a way that transcends both.)
**The abbreviation is of course out of Respect for the argument being made in this paragraph.
***Yes: Even [MicroSoft] Word did not recognise this word. It is real though.

Dm.A.A.

Thursday, August 20, 2015

The Racism of Rocks.

The Racism of Rocks.

It has recently come to my attention this fact: I don’t like black women.
I do not know WHY this is a fact. And just to be totally clear: I like black People. I like PEOPLE who happen to be women who happen to be PEOPLE – who are black. But not black women. Hm.
Well if it’s any consolation: I do not really like Russian or other Slavic women as well. I guess that you can’t go too close or too far; you have to be just right. And I must say: MY goldilocks zone is very, VERY wide.

But I’m not one of those GUYS who goes about saying: Oh, I can’t HELP but to be racist because it is in my genetics. That is none sense. There is nothing in human nature that makes us intrinsically racist. Just by saying “human nature” we all ready are affirming the humanity of the other. So how could we then use that to deny it? One would have to say: Well those sub-humans are less racist than I. And in THAT case can you really tell who is human and who is not?
Unless the sub-humans were MORE racist. Or it is not peculiar to human nature. Look! Rocks can be racist too. Ever noticed how igneous does not occur where sedimentary dwells? I WONDER WHY THAT IS.


Dm.A.A.

Friday, August 14, 2015

Meditation.

Meditation.

In practical life, thought is used just as a crutch, a means to an end, and meditation is necessary to remind the calculating mind to rest.
Yet where thought is an end in and of its self, meditation is a hassle. True meditation, in its pure form, occurs to the man of depth only once the thoughts he has ALLOWED TO RUN THEIR COURSE (as in Taoism) have settled. If he knows that he is meditating, he is not meditating. The Nothingness that he has been THROWN into has been subsumed in SOMETHING. Meditation has become not an end in and of its self, the natural converse of thought for its own sake, now seen (though not by the meditator yet, thank fully) as no longer the transcendent OPPOSITE of thought but rather its imminent corollary.
Western dabblers who forget that the Western mind is historically of sharper intellect (Jung writes of this with profound respect notwithstanding to Easterners in his critique of The Secret of the Golden Flower, explaining that the Taoists had non-intellectual and may be even surpassing forms of Intelligence, but he described the Eastern intellect as comparably “childish” to Western intellect*) would do well not to use meditation as a means to an end. As Gibran wrote, he who favours one guest over an other loses the favour of both. So it is with the twin guests of thought and non-thought.

*To accuse him of hegemony is ridiculous. It is like what feminists do when they condemn “passive” depictions of women. Passivity is only rejected by virtue of the same patriarchy that they claim to oppose, and so it is that to describe one’s intellect as childish is an affront only made mortal by a culture that, as Jung demonstrates, has all ways EXCELLED and thus REVELED in the Intellect.  The argument is only circular because the conditions are circular; both parties are responsible for it. Jung proves that our over-valuation of the intellect came from our excellence in using it; the opponent proves, by one’s affront, that the excellence led to its over-valuation. The argument is semantic and self-referential by nature.


Dm.A.A.

Thursday, August 13, 2015

Anti-psychiatry: Why Freudian Slips are NOT Give-Aways.

I just yelled "You ARE old, Pumpkin!" after expending some energy to talk to Mother, though voluntarily this time.

At first I thought to make a be-laboured joke, saying, "Not you, Mom,"

And then I realised:

The only reason that I considered that alternate possibility and meaning was because the first clause could have been miss-Heard to have the meaning.

So when the Freudians attack us for our unconscious slips, it is only because the mind deliberately tries NOT to say all the wrong things[(] that we said that.[)]* So when they attack us for our "true meanings" they are in FACT exploiting the weakness of a tired and exhausted, anxious mind, faced with judgement, to discern everything that it WANTS to say from every thing that it wants NOT to say. The latter is a direct reaction to the questioner, and nothing else.

* After the thought, it is parenthetical. Parenthetically after the thought. Dans cors dans coeur.

Tourette's would thus be an intense surrender of the tight-rope walk.

Dmitry.(!!!!!!!!**)

** not quite contextual, for you asked me to follow up UNINTERESTING things with exclamations.

[[Dm.A.A.]]

Wednesday, August 12, 2015

Reservations. But not ABOUT my theiry. Rather on the conversely that prove it.

Something is defined in being reserved.
Something is defined as being reserved.
Something is defined by being reserved.
Being reserves defines it (some thing).
Something defines being reserved.

A defines B.
Though as stated previously:
A is defined by B.

Where A = Something.
And B = Being reserved.

Something defines Being reserved
Though as stated previously:
Something is defined by Being reserved.

Did I write that properly? On an organic level errors are theoretically possible.

Dm.A.A.

Tuesday, August 11, 2015

Interlocutor:

Interlocutor:

 iv.      i and ii imply that I am crazy. (a + b = c.[But what is c here? Is it that I am crazy? Either states that I am crazy given certain conditions that they share in common. Does the one (i[a]) depend upon the other (ii[b]) to make a point ([c])? Demonstrably yes. 13 proves 14 and 14 proves 13. [But do they depend upon EACH OTHER to PROVE C? Well if both are an expression OF C, in a Heidegerrean way, then yes. And C depends upon them as its manifestation.] But we must go through the cycle to see it this way. How do they depend upon each other, though? Is it not RATHER that ii and iii combined imply i? Demonstrably this is true as well. One is left wondering if in fact all warrants are hegemonic and hierarchical, based upon a naive epistemology rooted in tradition, that ignores that all reasoning in the absence of a Domineering Logos (Watts, Derrida) is circular because Life is one of mutual interdependence, mutual arising, and cyclical nature (Watts.).)
                                                             v.      14(i): If I am not sane, I am crazy.
                                                           vi.      13(ii)*: If I am not sane, but I believe myself to be, then I am crazy.
                                                          vii.      Since 14 all ready implies that I am crazy, granted that I am not sane, then my not being sane is sufficient to my being crazy in 13, regardless of whether or not I believe my self to be.
                                                        viii.      14 thus implies 13.” This makes no sense to me.

Speaker: Well, it is quite obvious.
You might have miss-read the bracketed statement to be an unwarranted assertion from whom I derived deductions in v through viii. Yet that is by your force of habit as a reader. In fact if any thing the obverse is true: The bracketed statement contained the deductions from v through viii, input after the fact, and hence* in bracketts. Bracketts indicate that I put this in as a second thought, usually.

Now, of course deductions and warrants are synonymous. When I made that claim it was not its self an unwarranted assertion; you just read it that way because you had not yet seen the entire picture. By the end I am sure that you will agree with me. But it is not even that my reasoning DEPENDS upon pretending this to be the case. Like I said, I meant this non-dual statement (that warrants are deductions, and that it is arbitrary how one treats them, as one or the other) as an APOLOGY for having even tried to define what is or is not a warrant or deduction. It was purely for YOUR consideration.

*Try not to cling to the semantics here.

Interlocutor: So you are saying that the bracketed statement (A) is warranted by v through viii (B).

Speaker: In a manner, yes.

Interlocutor: But you ALL so claim that B could just as easily warrant A.

Speaker: That is correct.

Interlocutor: And the bracketed statement (A) all so states that good reasonings are circular.

Speaker: Many of them, yes.

Interlocutor: And THAT is circular! Because A, then circular reasonings are good. You could call that C. And because C then A. I mean: Supposing I agree to what you said in brackets. Then I should all so believe that v through viii are not only warrants for A but deductions too, so they do not need warrants. But that is OKAY because everything is circular any way!

Speaker: Yes.

Interlocutor: What the hell???

Speaker: It’s trippy. Yeah.

Interlocutor: But what if I DON’T accept that? What if I refuse to accept A until you prove B?

Speaker: Then you are being will fully ignorant. For all is cyclical. Yes. A warrants B. B warrants A.

Interlocutor: But how does A warrant B?

Speaker: B warrants A. That we have established. A claims that all reasonings are circular. So A warrants B as well. And that is a circle. Which proves that B is true*. So A is true. So all reasonings are circular. So that this is a circle ought not to bother you. It all works.

Interlocutor: But if all reasonings were circular then this would go on infinitely!

Speaker: Actually it only ends the moment that you complete the circle.

Interlocutor: Only?

Speaker: I mean merely. Look. All reasonings are circular. If you go straight long enough you end up where you were. Only what leads to infinite regression is refusing to complete the circle. You keep going further and further on a line. THAT goes on forever. In theory only though. Because you might find that sooner or later your own most dearly prized linear narratives bend in on their selves as well. So just breathe out and accept the snake that eats its own tail as your condition where thought is concerned.

[Note what happens here. In fact every thing in brackets is not even an argument but I thought. They are not even related to one another in a binding way; parts of them could be true and parts un-true. Yet the Interlocutor sought a weakness the moment that the Speaker began his second paragraph, generously (on the part of the Speaker). The Interlocutor sought to exploit this generosity by attacking the circular argument. Yet by so doing he trapped his self, because he acknowledge all of the bracketed statement as ONE FACT. So by a kind of judo the Speaker was able to use that fact mathematically to prove its self.]

*Because A warrants B, but all so because this is a circle. Though the latter is not direct. If the circle is established to be valid, though, then that would directly prove A to be true. All so, speaking grammatically rather than mathematically, the full stop might be dropped to say “And that is a circle which proves that B is true,” as the prior sentence had all ready established, though the Interlouctor is still tentative to accept it because he is still waiting for B to be proven true as the starting phrase (ironic, considering that this is precisely what has just been proven.).

Dm.A.A.

Dm.

Kraziness. A Krazy Mess.

1.       Crazy is to be defined as not knowing that one is crazy.
2.       If I admit that I am crazy, then I am not crazy.
3.       By so doing I contradict my self instantaneously.
4.       My sanity there fore depends upon the contradiction.
5.       My insanity, in order to be acknowledged by me as a fact, depends upon contradiction.
6.       If I claim that I am sane then I cannot know it for certain to be true.
7.       Sanity cannot depend upon certainty as a pre-requisite.
8.       I can only be certain of my sanity if I believe in my own insanity.
9.       To believe myself to be some thing that I am not must therefore be sane.
10.   To believe myself to be some thing that I am not is all so to be insane.
11.   The prerequisite for sanity is delusional pretense.
12.   The prerequisite for insanity is delusional pretense.

13.   If I believe myself to be sane, but this is not true, then I am crazy.
14.   If I am not sane, then I am crazy.
15.   If I believe myself to be sane, but I am crazy, then I am crazy.

A.      15 is a circular reasoning. (a x b = b). This seems to suggest that either a is 1 or b is zero.
B.      15 is the conclusion from 13 and 14 in relation to one an other. (a + b = c.)
C.      14 can all so be a conclusion from 13. (a = b.).
a.       13: a(-a)=b
b.      14: -a=b.
D.      C.a. and C.b. are warrants *for* C, grammatically.
E.       C.a. and C.b. are deductions FROM C, mathematically.
F.       13 can all so be a conclusion from 14.
a.       Warrants: (this is an arbitrary sign-post, for all warrants can be deductions.)
                                                               i.      14: If I am not sane, I am crazy.
                                                             ii.      13: If it is not true that I am sane, then I am not sane. (this is linguistically implicit, though perhaps more sophisticated charts will include what is grammatically implicit as a separate numbered assertion.)
                                                            iii.      13 can thus be expressed as: If I am not sane, but I believe myself to be, then I am crazy.
                                                           iv.      i and ii imply that I am crazy. (a + b = c.[But what is c here? Is it that I am crazy? Either states that I am crazy given certain conditions that they share in common. Does the one (i[a]) depend upon the other (ii[b]) to make a point ([c])? Demonstrably yes. 13 proves 14 and 14 proves 13. [But do they depend upon EACH OTHER to PROVE C? Well if both are an expression OF C, in a Heidegerrean way, then yes. And C depends upon them as its manifestation.] But we must go through the cycle to see it this way. How do they depend upon each other, though? Is it not RATHER that ii and iii combined imply i? Demonstrably this is true as well. One is left wondering if in fact all warrants are hegemonic and hierarchical, based upon a naive epistemology rooted in tradition, that ignores that all reasoning in the absence of a Domineering Logos (Watts, Derrida) is circular because Life is one of mutual interdependence, mutual arising, and cyclical nature (Watts.).)
                                                             v.      14(i): If I am not sane, I am crazy.
                                                           vi.      13(ii)*: If I am not sane, but I believe myself to be, then I am crazy.
                                                          vii.      Since 14 all ready implies that I am crazy, granted that I am not sane, then my not being sane is sufficient to my being crazy in 13, regardless of whether or not I believe my self to be.
                                                        viii.      14 thus implies 13.
*expressed by cross-reference to iii.
b.      Deductions: (this is an arbitrary sign-post, for all deductions can be warrants.)
                                                               i.      14: –a=b.
                                                             ii.      13: a(-a)=b.
                                                            iii.      This means: a is equal to 1. Unless –a were equal to 0. A negative cannot be zero. Unless zero is defined grammatically as THE negation. Mathematically, then, a = -a = b = 0.
                                                           iv.      Because – 0 = 0.
It begins to look as though Sanity and Insanity are the same, from the perspective of Logic. Lucid Reason must note its limits then, unless Insanity is just a Sign assigned by a Signifier to a Signified (Foucault.) It ALL so looks as though I can never be insane subjectively, but only in the eyes of the Signifier. Yet since the signifier claims to pass judgment upon my Soul, defining Sanity as something that depends upon my “not knowing that I am crazy”, this seems contradictory on the part of the Signifier, for now insanity is defined in TERMS of my subjectivity again.
So we have to either abandon the notion that “crazy people do not know that they are crazy”, which was our initial premise here, or we must note that logic has little to say of the distinction betwixt Sanity and Insanity.

Please re-view and re-vise. If it is not redundant to say that, for vise means to view.


Dm.A.A.