Kraziness. A Krazy Mess.

1.       Crazy is to be defined as not knowing that one is crazy.

2.       If I admit that I am crazy, then I am not crazy.

3.       By so doing I contradict my self instantaneously.

4.       My sanity there fore depends upon the contradiction.

5.       My insanity, in order to be acknowledged by me as a fact, depends upon contradiction.

6.       If I claim that I am sane then I cannot know it for certain to be true.

7.       Sanity cannot depend upon certainty as a pre-requisite.

8.       I can only be certain of my sanity if I believe in my own insanity.

9.       To believe myself to be some thing that I am not must therefore be sane.

10.   To believe myself to be some thing that I am not is all so to be insane.

11.   The prerequisite for sanity is delusional pretense.

12.   The prerequisite for insanity is delusional pretense.

13.   If I believe myself to be sane, but this is not true, then I am crazy.

14.   If I am not sane, then I am crazy.

15.   If I believe myself to be sane, but I am crazy, then I am crazy.

A.      15 is a circular reasoning. (a x b = b). This seems to suggest that either a is 1 or b is zero.

B.      15 is the conclusion from 13 and 14 in relation to one an other. (a + b = c.)

C.      14 can all so be a conclusion from 13. (a = b.).

a.       13: a(-a)=b

b.      14: -a=b.

D.      C.a. and C.b. are warrants *for* C, grammatically.

E.       C.a. and C.b. are deductions FROM C, mathematically.

F.       13 can all so be a conclusion from 14.

a.       Warrants: (this is an arbitrary sign-post, for all warrants can be deductions.)

                                                               i.      14: If I am not sane, I am crazy.

                                                             ii.      13: If it is not true that I am sane, then I am not sane. (this is linguistically implicit, though perhaps more sophisticated charts will include what is grammatically implicit as a separate numbered assertion.)

                                                            iii.      13 can thus be expressed as: If I am not sane, but I believe myself to be, then I am crazy.

                                                           iv.      i and ii imply that I am crazy. (a + b = c.[But what is c here? Is it that I am crazy? Either states that I am crazy given certain conditions that they share in common. Does the one (i[a]) depend upon the other (ii[b]) to make a point ([c])? Demonstrably yes. 13 proves 14 and 14 proves 13. [But do they depend upon EACH OTHER to PROVE C? Well if both are an expression OF C, in a Heidegerrean way, then yes. And C depends upon them as its manifestation.] But we must go through the cycle to see it this way. How do they depend upon each other, though? Is it not RATHER that ii and iii combined imply i? Demonstrably this is true as well. One is left wondering if in fact all warrants are hegemonic and hierarchical, based upon a naive epistemology rooted in tradition, that ignores that all reasoning in the absence of a Domineering Logos (Watts, Derrida) is circular because Life is one of mutual interdependence, mutual arising, and cyclical nature (Watts.).)

                                                             v.      14(i): If I am not sane, I am crazy.

                                                           vi.      13(ii)*: If I am not sane, but I believe myself to be, then I am crazy.

                                                          vii.      Since 14 all ready implies that I am crazy, granted that I am not sane, then my not being sane is sufficient to my being crazy in 13, regardless of whether or not I believe my self to be.

                                                        viii.      14 thus implies 13.

*expressed by cross-reference to iii.

b.      Deductions: (this is an arbitrary sign-post, for all deductions can be warrants.)

                                                               i.      14: –a=b.

                                                             ii.      13: a(-a)=b.

                                                            iii.      This means: a is equal to 1. Unless –a were equal to 0. A negative cannot be zero. Unless zero is defined grammatically as THE negation. Mathematically, then, a = -a = b = 0.

                                                           iv.      Because – 0 = 0.

It begins to look as though Sanity and Insanity are the same, from the perspective of Logic. Lucid Reason must note its limits then, unless Insanity is just a Sign assigned by a Signifier to a Signified (Foucault.) It ALL so looks as though I can never be insane subjectively, but only in the eyes of the Signifier. Yet since the signifier claims to pass judgment upon my Soul, defining Sanity as something that depends upon my “not knowing that I am crazy”, this seems contradictory on the part of the Signifier, for now insanity is defined in TERMS of my subjectivity again.

So we have to either abandon the notion that “crazy people do not know that they are crazy”, which was our initial premise here, or we must note that logic has little to say of the distinction betwixt Sanity and Insanity.

Please re-view and re-vise. If it is not redundant to say that, for vise means to view.

Dm.A.A.